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In this paper we address some of the issues resulting from Poland￿s will to join the Economic and 
Monetary Union. Our attention focuses on topics related to the possibly soon entry into the 
European exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). We consider the possible paths of entering the 
system, providing a detailed analysis of the choice of fluctuation margins and the central parity. 
 
Further, we analyze the possible monetary policy strategies within the system. We describe the 
benefits and drawbacks of ERM II participation and consider the eventuality of parity 
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As the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 is almost certain, the preparation of the 
accession countries to join the Eurosystem gains importance and momentum. The National Bank 
of Poland is strongly willing to join the euro area as soon as possible and, with respect to its 
competence, feels responsible for the best preparation of Poland for this event.  
 
To join the EMU, Poland has to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria. First, this requires the 
central bank to lower inflation in a credible way. Second, the credibility of low inflation must be 
confirmed by market expectations in form of low long-term interest rates.Third, this requires the 
government to make an effort to lower the public finance deficit and prevent public debt from 
increasing excessively. Finally, this requires the Ministry of Finance and the NBP to prepare and 
introduce a successful program of participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). 
 
One paper cannot be enough to describe all the issues arising only from the necessity to fulfill the 
convergence criteria. Hence, we will concentrate on topics related to the perspective of ERM II 
participation. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part 1 describes briefly the Polish 
experience with exchange rate regimes in the period 1990-2002. Part 2 discusses the issues 
related to entering ERM II. Special interest will be placed on choosing the right parity and the 
width of fluctuation bands. Part 3 will be devoted to describing our view on how to proceed after 
joining the system. In particular we will try to estimate the necessary appreciation of the Polish 
currency during the participation period, discuss issues resulting from the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect and consider the possibility of revaluing the central parity during the participation. Part 4 
concludes. 
 
1 Towards  ERM  II 
 
For the last 12 years, the Polish economy has witnessed a gradual drop in the inflation rate. Since 
1990 CPI inflation decreased more than two hundred times, from over 250% in December 1990 
to a low of 0,9 in December 2002. During this period the exchange rate regime has been 
frequently adjusted to changing economic conditions. When suppressing hyperinflation in 1990  
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required a credible nominal anchor for the economy, the zloty was fixed to the US Dollar. In fall 
1991, to soften further real appreciation of the currency, Poland introduced a crawling peg. The 
pre-announced rate of crawl was set lower than the difference between domestic and external 
inflation. It allowed tempering the real appreciation of the currency, giving some room for 
smooth real sector adjustment. In this way polish monetary authorities avoided shock loss of 
competitiveness of enterprises. This mechanism became unsustainable in 1995, when huge 
foreign currency inflows (surplus in current account, as well, as FDI and portfolio investment) 
generated an enormous increase in foreign reserves (more than USD 9 bn within 12 months, what 
equalled 140% increase in reserves) and NBP sterilizing operations. Again the exchange rate 




In 1998, the newly established Monetary Policy Council (MPC) decided to change the monetary 
policy strategy of the NBP, and introduced the regime of direct inflation targeting (DIT). The 
￿Medium-Term Strategy of Monetary Policy 1999-2003￿ set a goal of below 4% for the inflation 
rate in 2003, and announced floating the zloty exchange rate in the future. According to the 
Strategy, this move was supposed to let market forces bring the market rate closer to its 
equilibrium level, before the Polish currency would enter ERM II.  
 
The floating found place in April 2000, however actually the deep regime changes occurred 
already in 1998, when the NBP stopped FX interventions, and in 1999, when it ceased so called 
fixing operations with the banking sector. Soon after the floating, in July 2000, the process of 
strong appreciation, both in real and nominal terms started (Fig. 1). However, as it can be seen, 
finally the real effective exchange rate returned to its long run appreciation path of about 5 % per 
annum. Thus, although increased volatility of the series can be clearly observed, the evidence 
speaks strongly against the often-repeated view, that floating the exchange rate would 




                                                           
2 The history of exchange rate regimes in Poland is presented in Appendix 1.  
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Abandoning the crawling band helped to resolve one of the most serious problems faced by the 
Polish monetary policy in the 1990￿s - the problem of internal inconsistency. Sterilized 
interventions in the FX market led to a fast increase in foreign reserves and debt issued by the 
central bank to mop up the resulting liquidity. In 1998 the estimated liquidity surplus absorbed by 
the central bank exceeded PLN 28 bn (USD 8 bn). Since excess liquidity had been mopped up via 
open market sales of NBP bills, the central bank incurred a huge cost estimated at nearly 1% of 
GDP in 1998. Since foreign exchange interventions had been abandoned, the amount of 
outstanding NBP bills has been slowly decreasing. Both the reduction of the excess liquidity 
itself, as well as falling interest rates contributed to significant lower cost of sterilization  which 
amounted approximately to 0.3% of GDP in 2001. The expected cost of servicing the NBP debt 
in the next years should shrink further (Szpunar 2002). 
 
It can be also said with much certainty that the floating exchange rate protected Poland against 
turbulence that recently took place in emerging markets around the world. The reactions at the  
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Polish FX market were tempered even in the event of the Argentinean crisis, or the huge external 
imbalance on the Polish current account which exceeded 8% of GDP in Q1 2000 (Fig. 2). 
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a) Basket consists of 45% USD and 55% EUR. 
Source: NBP 
 
From the perspective of over 3 years it can be said unambiguously that the floating exchange rate 
was a good choice for the Polish economy. Not only did it solve the problem of long run 
inconsistency of monetary policy, but also immunized the economy against external shocks that 
could have otherwise caused a currency crisis. There is no simple a priori first best choice of an 
exchange rate system for any country. Considered as an element of economic policy it depends 
on the fiscal and monetary policy applied by a country. Too loose fiscal policy may lead to an  
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inconsistent policy mix, and in case of fixed exchange rate, to a currency crisis. In our opinion, 
given the track of fiscal policy the choice made for Poland was adequate. There is an additional 
argument against fixed regimes for emerging markets ￿ a country with even sound policy mix 
may not sustain a contagion effect. Hence, in our view, Poland should stick to the floating 
exchange regime in the nearest future, until the ERM II entry. 
 
2  ERM II - getting inside 
 
As it has previously been noted, direct inflation targeting with a floating exchange rate seems to 
be a well designed monetary policy regime for a country like Poland. Thus, from our point of 
view, the quasi-fixed exchange rate system we have to go through in order to fulfill the 
Maastricht criteria cannot be considered as a very tempting one. Consequently, it seems to be a 
reasonable solution to proceed in a way that will guarantee as short as possible participation in 
ERM II. In view of the EMU accession procedure this means not much longer than two years of 
participation, provided that at the moment of evaluation Poland will fulfill the remaining 
convergence criteria.  
 
2.1  Fulfilling the convergence criteria 
 
Hence, from our point of view, entering the ERM II will make sense only, if the remaining 
Maastricht criteria are to be met within 2 years. Below we present a brief discussion of all the 
criteria: 
i)  inflation: as already mentioned, in mid 2002 CPI inflation came to a low level of only 
1.3%. To our best knowledge, the HICP for Poland shows only minor difference against 
CPI, and its average over the last 12 month has fallen in August 2002 to 2.9% so that 
Poland was able to fulfill, for the first time, the Maastricht inflation criterion (Fig.3). 
It is the intention of the MPC to stabilize the CPI growth rate at 3% (with a tolerance band 
of +/- 1 p.p.) in 2003. If we assume a similar ongoing target for the future and consider 
that the reference value can be expected to fluctuate around 2-2.5% over the long run, 
inflation will probably require a slight lowering before the evaluation. This, however 
should not be a major issue.  
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Source: NBP calculations based on Eurostat and Central Statistical Office data  
 
ii)  interest rates: in September 2002 Polish 10-year bonds were traded with a yield of 
approximately 6.4%. However, as interest rates in Poland have been falling over the last 
20 months, the 12-month average still is much higher than the current reference value 
(Fig. 4). One can be pretty sure that, at the latest after entering ERM II, interest rates will 
gradually converge to EMU levels, as it happened in Greece in 1999 - 2000, provided that 
the parity would be credible (Borowski, Woreta 2002). 
 
iii)  public debt: in 2001 public debt attained 38.7 % of GDP (Tab. 1). Although the ratio has 
been rising and is projected to grow further over the recent future, we do not see a major 
threat that the explosion of debt over the 60% reference value could jeopardize Poland￿s 
accession to the EMU. This is because of the very strict legal provisions, which oblige the 
government to provide a budget in surplus if the debt (increased with anticipated guaranty 
and surety payments) to GDP ratio exceeds 55%. Moreover, the constitution does not  
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permit to contract public loans or guarantees that would engender the public debt 
exceeding 60 % of GDP.  
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Source: NBP calculation based on Eurostat and Bloomberg data 
 
Table 1: Public debt in Poland (as % of GDP) 2001-2005  
2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  Specification 
Execution Forecast 
Public debt increased with 
anticipated guaranty and surety 
payments 
43.2  49.7  52.2 53.8 54.0 
General government debt (ESA￿95)
 *  38.7  43.3  45.1 46.0 45.6 
* Acc. to the ESA 95, the general government sector debt does not include matured liabilities of budget units that are 
treated as accrual basis expenditures but they constitute an element of the debt according to the Polish methodology. 
Source: PEP (2002) 
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iv)  public finance deficit: the public finance deficit in 2002 will probably exceed 5.4% of 
GDP (4.1% according to ESA 95), which is well above the Maastricht benchmark. 
Although the government projections are relatively favorable and point at going below 
3% in 2005 (Tab. 2), in our opinion the deficit can become the major obstacle to the 
fulfillment of convergence criteria. Not only is the projected safety distance from the 
reference level relatively small
3 (only 0.8 p.p.), but also is 2005 an election year and those 
are never favorable for fiscal tightening. Moreover, the estimates are based on relatively 
high growth rate assumptions, which seem realistic only in case of structural reforms 
being pursued (Borowski, Woreta 2002).   
 
Table 2: Public sector balance (as % of GDP) 2001-2005 
2001  2002 2003 2004 2005   
Execution Forecast 
Balance  (ESA￿95)  -3.5  -4.1 -3.6 -3.3 -2.2 
Source: PEP (2002) 
 
Summing up, it could be basically possible for Poland to fulfill the convergence criteria during an 
evaluation in 2006. This implies that Poland would enter ERM II in 2004. Relying on Greek 
experience (Garganas, Tavlas 2000) we must expect that the process of negotiating the 
participation conditions with the European Commission will take at least 3 months. This makes 
the following scenario possible: immediately after entering the EU (1 May 2004) Poland starts 
negotiations with the Commission. In the third or fourth quarter 2004 we join the ERM, and in 
fall 2006 Poland is positively evaluated in Convergence Reports of the European Commission 
and the ECB. This scenario seems tight but realistic, provided that it will not be jeopardized by 
the aforementioned problems with fiscal policy. 
 
Having said this, following issues have to be analyzed: First, the central parity has to be chosen. 
Second, the band width is not unambiguously stated, and theoretically we can choose between +/-
2.25 and +/-15%. 
 
                                                           
3 It must, however be noted that the recent figures available from the Ministry of Finance, presented in the 2003 
Budget Law, are more favorable and point at a deficit of only 1-2% in 2005.   
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2.2  Choosing the central parity 
 
Choosing the central parity for ERM II will be a difficult issue, not only because of supposedly 
hard negotiations with the European Commission and the ECB, but also due to the analytical 
burden. As there are various ways to calculate the equilibrium rate of exchange, there is very 
scarce knowledge, which is the best one, and they will probably return different results (ECB 
2002 b). Despite these problems, below some preliminary results are presented.  
 
Three different methods have been recently applied at the National Bank of Poland to estimate 
the equilibrium rate of exchange (Rubaszek 2002); one based on the corrected Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) concept, one known as the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) 
approach and one based on the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) methodology. 
 
The approach based on PPP is a two step algorithm (Brook, Hargreaves 2001; Baude, Coudert, 
Couarde 2002). In the first step the exchange rate that would result from applying directly the 
concept of absolute purchasing power parity is being calculated. Obviously the rates differ 
substantially from the market rates (for instance according to this estimate, the zloty equilibrium 
exchange rate in 2000 should have been 1.98 PLN/USD against 4.34 PLN/USD average market 
rate). This estimate must be corrected by the difference in GDP per capita between countries, 
which is the second step of the analysis. The results suggest an undervaluation of the Polish 
currency over the recent years (Tab. 3). 
 
Table 3: Estimates of over or undervaluation of the Polish currency based on the corrected PPP 
concept 
Year  1998 1999 2000 2001 
over(+)/undervaluation(-) of PLN  -5%  -10.5%  -10.6%  -3.8% 
Source: Rubaszek (2002) 
 
In order to calculate the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (Wiliamson 1985) two 
estimates are necessary: the exchange rate elasticities of exports and imports and the long term 
sustainable current account position. For the need of our estimation the elasticities have been 
calibrated at -0.5 and 0.5 (broadly in line with econometric estimates) and the sustainable current  
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account was approximated by the 4 quarter moving average of FDI inflows. Having assumed this, 
one has to calculate the equilibrium exchange rate that would have equalized the current account 
balance with long term financing possibilities in each period of time. Table 4 presents the results 
of comparing the actual and equilibrium exchange rates over the period Q1 2001 - Q2 2002. The 
results suggest a slight overvaluation of the zloty. 
 
Table 4: Estimates of over or undervaluation of the Polish currency based on the FEER concept. 
Date  Q1 2001 Q2 2001 Q3 2001 Q4 2001  Q1 2002  Q2 2002
over(+)/undervaluation(-)  of  PLN  1.96% 1.36% -3.40%  0.63% 2.12% 1.68% 
Source: Rubaszek (2002) 
 
The Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate concept (Alberola et al. 1999; Habereier, 
Mesquita 1999; Brook, Hargreaves 2001) is based on the estimation of a long run relationship 
between the real exchange rate and various macroeconomic variables. The following equation 
was estimated, based on panel cointegration for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic: 
 
gbal tt pr rer
) 89 , 1 ( ) 91 , 6 ( ) 5 , 18 (
63 , 0 22 , 0 29 , 1 02 , 0 + + + = , 
 
where rer is the real exchange rate, pr - productivity, tt - terms of trade and gbal stands for the 
central budget balance, numbers in brackets  stand for T-Student Statistics. These factors explain 
90% of the real appreciation of the currency. The residuals show the degree of over or 
undervaluation of the zloty over the period 1990-2001 (Fig. 5). It can be clearly seen that there is 
a tendency of the exchange rate to return relatively quickly to its equilibrium level. 
 
Figure 5: The equilibrium exchange rate and over or undervaluation of the Polish currency based 
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Source: Rubaszek (2002) 
 
Summing up, the results do not give an unambiguous answer to the question of over and 
undervaluation of the Polish currency. What is however important, is their consistence on the 
magnitude of indicated imbalances. It comes out that whether under or overvalued, the zloty is 
not traded far away from its equilibrium value and imbalances are probably (based on BEER) 
relatively quickly corrected. Thus, from the economic point of view, if no extraordinary 
exchange rate movements occur on the eve of ERM II accession, there will probably be not 
much need to choose the central parity far away from the market exchange rate.  
 
2.3  Choosing the fluctuation bands 
 
The second important decision regarding Poland￿s entry into the ERM is the choice of fluctuation 
bands. The European Council decided in its 1997 resolution that one should interpret ￿normal 
fluctuation bands￿ referred to in the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 121) as +/- 15% around the central 
parity. However the institutions responsible for preparation of convergence reports are not clear, 
how they interpret the Treaty provisions. According to the recent Convergence Report on Sweden 
(EC 2002), one of the conditions to be respected in fulfilling the exchange rate criterion is as 
follows: 
 
„Exchange rate to have been maintained within a fluctuation band of ±2.25% around the 
currency's central parity against the euro in the context of the ERM II. However, the 
extent to which a breach of the ±2.25% fluctuation band would correspond to severe 
tensions would take account of a range of relevant considerations. A distinction is to be  
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made between exchange rate movements above the 2.25% upper margin and movements 
below the 2.25% lower margin.” 
 
The ECB is even more enigmatic about its application of the Treaty provisions. In the latest 
Convergence Report (ECB 2002) the following interpretation is provided: 
 
„... in the assessment of exchange rate developments the emphasis is placed on exchange 
rates being close to the ERM II central rates. [...] the issue of “severe tensions” is 
generally addressed by examining the degree of deviation of exchange rates from the 
ERM II central rates against the euro, by using such indicators as short-term interest rate 
differentials vis-à-vis the euro area and their evolution, and by considering the role 
played by foreign exchange interventions.” 
 
Thus, although the focus is on the narrow bands, in both cases it is not clear what fluctuations 
will be regarded as a breach of the bands. Moreover, in both cases the application is provided 
with regard to the current evaluation, without mentioning the procedure that would be applied in 
the future. Relying on previous experience with Greece, one can only expect that (at least when 
the wide corridor is adopted) both the Commission and the ECB will accept appreciation above 
the 2.25% margin.  
 
It need not be explained thoroughly that such a situation is very uncomfortable for the future EU 
members, Poland included. As noted earlier, we are not convinced, whether a quasi-fixed 
exchange rate arrangement is the proper one for a country like Poland as it can be less sustainable 
than a float. However, the rules have been set and we are strongly willing to follow them and 
fulfill all the convergence criteria as described in the Treaty. Nevertheless, it would be desirable 
to have a clear description of how the treaty will be applied. Thus, instead of a vague 
description, how the Treaty provisions have been interpreted, we would rather know, how they 
will be applied during the next evaluation. 
 
Nevertheless, some basic conclusions can be drawn. First, each depreciation of the exchange rate 
below the +/- 2.25 margin can be regarded as incompatible with the convergence process and  
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thus, has to be avoided. On the other hand a long-term trend for real appreciation of the zloty 
should be expected (due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect and other factors described in more 
detail in part 4.2). Accordingly, the currency must be allowed to appreciate, possibly above the 
2.25% benchmark over the two year horizon.  Taking these issues into account, the most 
reasonable solution seems to be adopting the wide +/- 15% fluctuations margin and setting an 
informal intervention band just below (say ca. 2%) the central parity.  
 
This solution, though the most reasonable one from the macroeconomic point of view, has one 
strong disadvantage - it requires intramarginal interventions. As opposed to interventions at the 
margins, these do not find unlimited support from the ECB. The ceiling for these operations is 
being set within a bilateral agreement between the ECB and the non euro-area member states￿ 
central banks and has been recently only symbolical
4 (EUR 520 mln for Denmark, EUR 300 mln 
for Greece, EUR 990 mln for Sweeden and EUR 3,480 mln for England). As national central 
banks ought to make ￿appropriate use￿ of their own reserves, before they use the ECB facility, it 
seems highly unlikely that Poland would really need the ECB money. Even using a small part 
(say 25%) of our foreign reserves (USD 30 bn at the end of 2002) to defend the exchange rate, 
should be considered a useless and costly struggle against the markets and would be probably 
classified as ￿severe tensions￿. Hence, the support of the ECB is in fact needed to strengthen the 
stance of the NBP versus the markets. This can be achieved by setting a high ceiling for intra 




3  ERM II - staying inside 
 
 
In the previous section it has been stated that Poland should try to enter the ERM II in early 2004, 
with the central parity set at a level consistent with the long-term equilibrium exchange rate and 
with wide fluctuations margins. Now it is time to consider issues related to the behavior within 
the system. Two basic topics emerge. First, it is possible that Poland will enter ERM II with 
                                                           
4 ECB (1998)  
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inflation slightly above the reference value. It must be decided whether monetary policy, with 
regard to the inflation level, should be conducted as before - by raising interest rates or/and by 
letting the currency appreciate. Second, it has to be estimated how much real and nominal 
appreciation should be expected during the participation period and whether the possibility of 
revaluing the central parity should be considered. 
 
3.1  How to reduce inflation? 
 
Let us assume that Poland enters 2004 with an inflation target of 3% (+/- 1 p.p.). In what follows 
we assume that inflation will be in the middle of the target range by then. Moreover, we work 
under the assumption that there will be no contribution from the side of fiscal policy to 
antiinflationary policy. Since it can be assumed that the reference value for inflation will 
probably lie between 2 and 2.5%, a lowering of the inflation rate by some 1-1.5 p.p. during the 
first year of ERM II participation and keeping it at the lower level during the second year will be 
necessary. The reason is that inflation performance during the second year will be taken into 
consideration when verifying compliance with convergence criteria.  
 
This job could be basically done in two ways, either by raising interest rates (which de facto 
means a continuation of DIT in ERM II) or by letting the exchange rate appreciate. It must be 
noted that the option of reducing inflation by making use of the appreciation pressure, stemming 
from the convergence play process, is relatively tempting. On the other hand, too much 
appreciation over a short time period can be painful for the external sector. To look deeper into 
the matter, simple simulations have been performed, showing how inflation reacts to changes in 
real interest rates and the exchange rate. The presented results come from a 3 dimensional VAR 
model, very similar conclusions can also be drawn from the small structural model of the NBP 
(Łyziak 2001). 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the results. First, the inflation response to an exchange rate 
shock is definitely quicker than to an interest rate shock, the first one exerting the strongest 
impact after 8 months against 16 months in the second case. Second, taking into account the 
magnitude of residual standard deviations, the same 0.5 p.p. drop in the inflation rate can be  
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achieved either by raising interest rates by 1 p.p. or by letting the currency appreciate by 
approximately 2.5 percent. 
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In view of these results, the option of currency appreciation that would lead to a drop in inflation 
looks tempting. First, inflation reacts to an exchange rate shock much faster than to interest rates. 
As time will be scarce this is obviously a major advantage. Second, maybe even more important,  
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it has to be born in mind that once the accession scenario becomes clear, mid and long term 
interest rates will be guided by markets, regardless of what the central bank does with short term 
rates. And as, to some extent, longer-term rates are seen as transmitters of monetary policy 
impulses, interest rate policy can prove less efficient under ERM II.  
 
3.2  To revalue or not to revalue? 
 
It has been shown in the previous section that to lower inflation the NBP will have to let the zloty 
appreciate. This can be basically done either by using the appreciation potential of convergence 
play or the short-term interest rate. Based on the above-presented results it can be roughly 
estimated that to reduce inflation by 1-1.5 p.p. the nominal exchange rate will have to appreciate 
by 5-7.5% within the first year of ERM II participation. This is, however not the end of the 
appreciation story. Thinking about a converging economy, one has always to bear in mind the 
magnitude and potential consequences of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Although there is some 
divergence of opinion among experts, recent results from the NBP show that the magnitude of the 
B-S effect is approximately 1.2-1.7%, somewhere in the middle of external estimates. Thus, for 
further simulations we will apply 1.5% as a benchmark assumption about the B-S effect. In Box 1 
we present a brief discussion of the B-S estimates for Poland. 
 
Once inflation will be reduced to EMU levels, the currency will appreciate further. This is 
because of the appreciation of the real exchange rate caused by the B-S effect, which, at equal 
inflation rates between Poland and the EMU must come up as nominal appreciation. If we 
assume that the disinflation will be finished after 1 year (i.e. in the end of 2004), we should 
expect some additional appreciation in 2005. In case of full pass-through from the exchange rate 
to domestic tradable prices this appreciation would be equal to the magnitude of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. However, as available estimates of the pass-through point rather at values 
below 1, the B-S effect should be considered as the lower end of the possible appreciation. Thus, 
we can roughly assume that in 2005 at least 1.5% additional nominal appreciation should be 
expected to keep inflation stable. 
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Summing together the appreciation caused by B-S and by the central bank to reduce inflation we 
arrive at a minimum of 6.5-8% of nominal appreciation over the first 2 years of ERM II 
participation. This is of course a very rough estimate, and serves only to show the potential 
consequences of the convergence of the inflation rate during ERM II participation. In such a case 
the competitiveness of the export sector could be endangered. 
 
Box 1: Estimating the Balassa-Samuelson effect in Poland 
 
Over the recent years many authors have presented estimates of the B-S impact on inflation in 
Poland. Among others Egert (2002) and Egert et al. (2002) estimate the B-S component of CPI 
inflation at approximately 1-2%. Halpern and Wyplosz calculated the effect within a panel of 
transition countries and assessed the B-S magnitude at 3% across the region with relatively minor 
country specific effects.  
 
At the NBP a method similar to Canzoneri et al. (1999) has been adopted (Chmielewski 2002). 
The basic model consists of 2 standard equations: 
(1) p=α pT +(1-α )pN 
(2) pN-pT= β (aT-aN) 
which imply: 
(3) p=pT +(1-α )β (aT-aN) 
 
Where p is the log CPI price level, pN is the log of service prices, pT the log of manufacturing 
prices, aN the log of productivity in manufacturing industry and aT the log of productivity in 
services. 
 
The (1-α ) coefficient, being the share of services in CPI, has been calibrated at 0.3, β  has been 
estimated from equation (2) by cointegration techniques at 1.2-1.5. The productivity growth rates 
have been calculated as 8.2% per annum in manufacturing and 5% in the service sector. 
 
Accordingly, the component (1-α )β (aT-aN) of equation (3), representing the influence of B-S on 
inflation was estimated in the range 1.2-1.7% per annum.  
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One solution to this problem could be to choose a mixed monetary policy strategy, based on 
interest rate and exchange rate policy. Accordingly, the NBP should start reducing inflation, by 
raising interest rates even before entering ERM II, so that less nominal appreciation would be 
necessary to bring down the inflation rate. In this case the real cost of adjustment would be more 
equally divided between the domestic and external sector. Accordingly, if the zloty appreciation 
threatened to bring the exchange rate far away from the equilibrium level, the NBP might 
consider using sterilized FX interventions. In this case the return of the exchange rate to parity 
would not be such a burning issue. There are, however some caveats related to this strategy. First, 
fine-tuning of inflation via interest rate policy requires very precise estimates of the neutral level 
of interest rates. This is unfortunately hardly the case in Poland (Brzoza-Brzezina 2002 a, 2002 
b). Second, as the transmission from interest rates to inflation takes much time (approximately 
1.5 years in Poland), action must be taken even before entering ERM II, which could 
substantially decrease its precision.  
 
In any case, as the possibility of substantial appreciation of the zloty cannot be ruled out, one has 
to consider how the final convergence to parity should be carried out. There are only two 
possibilities. The first is to revalue the parity, as in the case of Greece. The second, to let the 
exchange rate depreciate in the final stage of ERM II participation.  
 
Theoretically both possibilities are feasible and it is quite difficult to give a clear answer today, 
which solution will be chosen. The scenario of revaluation has been recently successfully carried 
out by Greece and accepted by the Commission (EC 2000) and the ECB (2000). From the 
economic point of view it would mean an adoption of the equilibrium exchange rate for the 
EMU entry (provided that the exchange rate will be set at the equilibrium level when 
entering ERM II).  
 
On the other hand, a sudden depreciation over the last few months of ERM participation would 
bring about a comparable, temporary depreciation of the real exchange rate and EMU entry with 
an undervalued currency (again, provided that the exchange rate will be set at the equilibrium 
level when entering ERM II). The obvious consequences would include an increase in inflation  
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and inflationary expectations. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that the depreciation would find 
place even before the evaluation deadline. In this case it could jeopardize Poland￿s convergence 
effort by fueling inflation. 
 
Summing up, from the economic point of view it seems reasonable to revalue the central 
parity during the ERM II participation period if the above-projected appreciation scenario 
should really find place. As it is, however widely known, such a decision can be very hard from 
the political point of view, because of the sudden loss of external competitiveness.   
 
All the above-mentioned problems put forward the question of the role fiscal policy should play 
in the process of achieving nominal convergence. Even without exploring the problem in 
depth, one can easily deduce that a fiscal tightening should increase the efficiency of 
monetary policy in reducing inflation, decrease the necessary appreciation of the zloty and 




In this paper we addressed some of the issues resulting from Poland￿s will to join the Economic 
and Monetary Union. Our attention focussed on topics related to the possibly soon entry into the 
European system of fixed exchange rates ERM II.  
 
As we are willing to join the EMU as fast as possible after entering the EU (probably in 2004), 
we should start negotiating the ERM II participation conditions with the European Commission 
immediately after joining the EU. This should make it possible to adopt the euro at the begin of 
2007. Our estimates provide evidence that over the recent past the zloty exchange rate fluctuated 
close to its equilibrium level. Thus, from the economic point of view, if no extraordinary 
exchange rate movements occur on the eve of ERM II accession, there will probably be not 
much need to choose the central parity far away from the market exchange rate. 
 
As regards the choice of the fluctuation bands, it is highly possible that a substantial appreciation 
of the zloty will take place during the ERM II participation period. Hence, we see the NBP  
  21
choosing the wide +/- 15% band to allow for necessary upward movement of the currency. 
However, as fluctuations on the weak side of the parity may be regarded as a breach of the treaty 
provisions, the NBP should set an informal intervention band just below the central parity. 
The tough issue would be however, to convince the markets that such intra-marginal 
interventions would be supported by the ECB. We see here a field of action for the ECB to either 
substantially increase or abandon the ceilings for intramarginal interventions. 
 
Further, we analyzed the possible exchange rate movements within the system. First, because of 
necessary adjustment of the inflation rate below the reference value, one should expect a 
substantial appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Second, the exchange rate appreciation due 
to the Balassa-Samuelson effect will certainly add to the trend. Our rough estimates point at a 
minimum of 6.5-8% appreciation of the nominal exchange rate during the first 2 years of 
participation, only because of the two above-mentioned factors. This can, however pose a serious 
problem to the competitiveness of the export sector. 
 
We see a solution to the problem of excessive appreciation in using a mixed strategy of interest 
rate and exchange rate policy. Accordingly interest rates should be raised before entering ERM II 
to lower inflation, so that the zloty appreciation can be reduced. There are, however some 
problems related to this strategy. First, interest rate policy might be weakened by the convergence 
trend of mid and long-term interest rates. Second, the transmission lags from interest rates are 
much longer than from the exchange rate, which could diminish the precision of this strategy. 
 
In any case, the possible exchange rate trend above the central parity will have to be somehow 
corrected within the ERM II. We conclude that it is at the moment difficult to asses, whether this 
target will be achieved via a revaluation of the parity or by allowing the exchange rate to 
depreciate towards parity in the final stage of ERM II. Although, from the economic point of 
view it seems more reasonable to revalue the parity than to let the exchange rate depreciate 
towards parity in the final stage of ERM II, such a decision can be very hard from the political 
point of view. We conclude that the efficiency of monetary policy in reducing inflation, and a 
lower necessary appreciation of the zloty would be strongly supported by a fiscal tightening. 
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Appendix 1: Exchange rate regimes in Poland 1990-2002 
Period  FX Regime  Band 
I.1990 - V.1991  Peg to USD    
V.1991 - X.1991  Peg to basket of currencies : 45% USD, 
35% DEM, 10% GBP, 5% FRF, 5% CHF  
 
X.1991 - V.1995  Pre-announced crawling peg   
V.1995 - II. 1998  Crawling band   +/-7 % 
II.1998 - X.1998  Crawling band   +/-10 % 
X.1998 - III. 1999  Crawling band. Basket redefined to 45% 
USD 55 % EUR (01.01.1999) 
+/-12,5 % 
III.1999 - IV.2000  Crawling band   +/-15 % 
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